Why is the wildcat formation successful

But now as we move towards the season whenever it starts , defenses have seen enough of the wildcat to game-plan against it and limit its success. Defenses continue to get better, suit and ties start to slowly creep away from calling plays and coaches learn that keeping their quarterback under center is always smarter than having a running back under center.

Goodbye, wildcat offense. Just like those three, I say to you, wildcat—good riddance. In order to understand the type of desperation that led the Dolphins to this point, you have to understand the mood surrounding the franchise in September About 18 months earlier, head coach Nick Saban ditched the franchise for Alabama.

Cam Cameron, the coach for the season, tried to calm a hoard of booing fans, upset about the first-round selection of Ted Ginn Jr. Miami then hired Parcells to run football operations and Sparano to coach the team. The hype surrounding the new regime ran aground quickly—they lost their first two games in uninspiring affairs. Not a fumble, not an interception. Beyond the sheer absurdity of seeing a quarterback in the slot and a running back under center, the most remarkable thing about the scheme, especially early on, was its sheer simplicity.

It was the same personnel on every play: two tight ends, three running backs. There were six plays. Power up the middle with Brown, sweep on the end with Williams, a counter on the backside of the play, and three passes tacked onto each one.

He paused to find the right phrase. It was knowing there was blood in the water and knowing that it was time to sniff it out. One of the best things about the wildcat, according to Harrison, was that the more you tried to stop it, the less likely you were to accomplish that goal. You have to be disciplined defense against the wildcat. The play can be traced back, on the surface, to the very start of football.

The wildcat is, in essence, a math problem. If you remove a pure passer from the equation, you have an extra blocker and you will always have an advantage when trying to move the ball down the field.

If the defense wants to stack the line of scrimmage, Brown—or anyone with a functional arm—could just throw. The offensive coaches explained that the wildcat solved a long-standing issue: How do you develop a quarterback run game without threatening the health of the quarterback?

In practice, the wildcat was deadly but the idea of the wildcat was even more valuable. Phillips explained to him that the Chargers spent a whole day of practice on defending the wildcat. He estimates that in most games, the team was in wildcat 20 percent of the time.

We got very basic defensive looks. This influence spread to other areas. Sparano wanted to install an unbalanced line, where one side has an extra tackle. Since defenses were simpler to read because of the fear of the wildcat, blockers could wreck defensive lines more easily. But nothing was as automatic as the wildcat package against a predictable defense—mostly basic man coverage.

Lee said that Williams running across the field was the key to the whole play. It is the perfect play, Goodman said, because no one has enough eye discipline to keep up. The offense built on itself until Brown was comfortable enough to read plays and run what is effectively a zone read. Cobbs said that against Seattle in Week 10, Brown was running an advanced form—over two years before the so-called zone-read revolution with quarterbacks like Tim Tebow, Colin Kaepernick, and Russell Wilson.

For all of its schematic shock, the wildcat would never exist without Brown and Williams, two of the most talented runners of the s.

Their smarts made the package go. The play, referred to as the "Philly Special", was run in a 4th and goal situation and saw running back Corey Clement take the snap, then pitch to tight end Trey Burton on a supposed reverse. Rather than run the ball, however, Burton passed the ball to quarterback Nick Foles who successfully caught the pass for a touchdown. Many other wildcat passes exist that rely on less intricate play design, but the central theme of misdirection remains.

Wildcat is a pretty novel formation all things considered. It's easily countered by a good disciplined defense. Both Malzahn and Lee ran a variation of the wildcat formation which prominently featured running backs Darren McFadden and Felix Jones.

The wildcat formation was sometimes called the "wildhog" in honor of the Razorback mascot at the University of Arkansas and subsequently rebranded as the "Wild Rebel" [8] when Arkansas head coach Houston Nutt went to Ole Miss as head coach Ole Miss' mascot being the Rebels , and a variation involving a direct snap to a tight end has also been called the "Wild Turkey" popularized by the Virginia Tech Hokies.

Several other college teams have used the wildcat formation regularly, including the wildcats of Kansas State , Kentucky , and Villanova , as well as the Pitt Panthers. The Panthers scored numerous times from this formation during those years. This formation is frequently called the "WildCobb" and is often very successful given the fact that Cobb also started numerous games at quarterback for Kentucky during his first year.

Villanova won the FCS championship with a multiple offense that included the wildcat, with wide receiver Matt Szczur taking the snap. UCF also uses a wildcat formation they call the "Wild Knight". Former Chiefs running back Larry Johnson lines up at the quarterback position in the wildcat formation, The wildcat formation made an appearance in , when Minnesota Vikings ' offensive coordinator Brian Billick began employing formations where QB Randall Cunningham lined-up as a wide receiver and third-down specialist David Palmer took the direct snap from the center with the option to pass or run.

In the NFC Championship , with to go in the third quarter, on a second and 5 play, the Atlanta Falcons deployed quarterback Chris Chandler wide left as a receiver while receiver Tim Dwight took a direct snap and ran 20 yards for a first down. In a December 24, game between the Carolina Panthers and Atlanta Falcons , the Panthers deployed a formation without a quarterback and snapped the ball directly to running back DeAngelo Williams for much of the game.

The offensive coordinator of the Carolina Panthers at the time, Dan Henning , later developed this concept into the wildcat as the offensive coordinator for the Miami Dolphins. Relying on the experience of quarterbacks coach David Lee who had run the scheme at Arkansas, the Miami Dolphins under Henning implemented the wildcat offense beginning in the third game of the season with great success, instigating a wider trend throughout the NFL. Through eleven games, the wildcat averaged over seven yards per play for the Dolphins.

Ronnie Brown far right of the Miami Dolphins passing out of the wildcat in November As the popularity of the wildcat spread during the NFL season , several teams began instituting it as a part of their playbook. Defending plays from the wildcat requires linemen and linebackers to know and execute their own assignments without over-pursuing what may turn into a fake or a reverse. The formation's initial success in can be attributed in part to surprise—defenses had not practiced their countermeasures against such an unusual offensive strategy.

Though defenses now understand how to stop the wildcat, it does not mean the formation is no longer useful. A defense's practice time is finite. Opponents who prepare to stop the wildcat have less time available to prepare for other offensive approaches. Many teams admit to spending an inordinate amount of time having to prepare for this scheme.