What was the peel report

Worse than the insufficiency of Arab schools, however is the nationalist character of the education provided in the schools of both communities and for that the Commission can see no remedy at all. The ideal system of education would be a single bi-national system for both races.

But that is virtually impossible under the Mandate, which prescribes the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language. Wherever practicable, e. As regards the Jews' claim for a larger grant for their system of education, the Commission consider that, until much more has been spent on the development of Arab education, so as to place it on a level with that of the Jews, it is unjustifiable to increase the grant to the latter, however desirable it might be in other circumstances.

The extent to which the Jews have taxed themselves for education is one of the best features of the National Home; and such "self-help" deserves all support; but it should not be given by altering the present proportion between the grant to the Jews and the amount spent on the Arabs; it should result from an increase in the total expenditure on education.

The contrast between the Arab and Jewish systems of education is most striking at the top. The Jews have a university of high quality. The Arabs have none and the young intelligenzia of the country are unable to complete their education without the cost and inconvenience of going abroad.

In any further discussion of the project of a British University in the Near East the possibility should be carefully considered of locating it in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem or Haifa.

The present system of rural self-government through local Councils falls short 1 in a lack of flexibility, 2 in undue centralization. An attempt should be made to strengthen those few local councils which still exist in the Arab rural areas, but the Commission do not favour an attempt at present to revivify councils which have broken down or to create new ones unless there is a genuine demand for them.

There can be little really effective extension of village self-government until the provision of primary education has had more time to take effect. The deficiencies of the present system of municipal government are 1 a lack of initiative on the part of the more backward municipalities, and 2 the limitations set to initiative on the part of the more progressive municipalities by an Ordinance which subjects them all to the same measure of Government control and centralized administration.

The limitation of power and responsibility largely accounts for the lack of interest shown by the townspeople in most municipal councils.

Tel Aviv has unique problems of its own caused by its phenomenal growth during the last five years. The objectives which the people of Tel Aviv have set before them in the way of social services are in themselves admirable, and the ratepayers have shown a commendable readiness to bear high rates for their realization.

The town has been faced with, and to a considerable extent surmounted, exceptional difficulties without seriously impairing its financial position. The more important local councils and all the municipalities should be reclassified by means of a new Ordinance into groups according to their respective size and importance. The degree of power and independence could then be varied to suit each class. For the first class of municipality the powers provided under the existing Ordinance are inadequate and should be extended.

The services of an expert authority on local government should be obtained to assist in drafting the new Ordinance and in improving and co-ordinating the relations between Government and the municipalities, particularly in the larger towns, with special reference to the need of removing the causes of the present delay in approving municipal budgets.

The need of Tel Aviv for a substantial loan should be promptly and sympathetically reconsidered. The normal constitutional relationship between the central and local authorities is impossible in Palestine. Such hopes as may have been entertained in of any quick advance towards self-government have become less tenable. The bar to it--Arab antagonism to the National Home--so far from weakening, has grown stronger. The Jewish leaders might acquiesce in the establishment of a Legislative Council on the basis of parity, but the Commission are convinced that parity is not a practicable solution of the problem.

It is difficult to believe that so artificial a device would operate effectively or last long, and in any case the Arab leaders would not accept it. The Commission do not recommend that any attempt be made to revive the proposal of a Legislative Council, but since it is desirable that the Government should have some regular and effective means of sounding public opinion on its policy, the Commission would welcome an enlargement of the Advisory Council by the addition of Unofficial Members, who might be in a majority and might be elected, who could make representations by way of resolution, but who would not be empowered to pass or reject the budget or other legislative measures.

Again, the Arabs are unlikely to accept such a proposal. The Arabs of Palestine, it has been admitted, are as fit to govern themselves as the Arabs of Iraq or Syria.

The Jews of Palestine are as fit to govern themselves as any organized and educated community in Europe. Yet, associated as they are under the Mandate, self-government is impracticable for both peoples. The Mandate cannot be fully implemented nor can it honourably terminate in the independence of an undivided Palestine unless the conflict between Arab and Jew can be composed.

The Commission recapitulate the conclusions set out in this part of the Report, and summarize the Arab and Jewish grievances and their own recommendations for the removal of such as are legitimate.

They add, however, that these are not the recommendations which their terms of reference require. They will not, that is to say, remove the grievances nor prevent their recurrence.

They are the best palliatives the Commission can devise for the disease from which Palestine is suffering, but they are only palliatives. They cannot cure the trouble. The disease is so deep-rooted that in the Commissioners' firm conviction the only hope of a cure lies in a surgical operation. The problem of Palestine is briefly restated.

Under the stress of the World War the British Government made promises to Arabs and Jews in order to obtain their support. On the strength of those promises both parties formed certain expectations. The application to Palestine of the Mandate System in general and of the specific Mandate in particular implies the belief that the obligations thus undertaken towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively would prove in course of time to be mutually compatible owing to the conciliatory effect on the Palestinian Arabs of the material prosperity which Jewish immigration would bring in Palestine as a whole.

That belief has not been justified, and there seems to be no hope of its being justified in the future. But the British people cannot on that account repudiate their obligations, and, apart from obligations, the existing circumstances in Palestine would still require the most strenuous efforts on the part of the Government which is responsible for the welfare of the country.

The existing circumstances are summarized as follows. An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country. There is no common ground between them. Their national aspirations are incompatible. The Arabs desire to revive the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews desire to show what they can achieve when restored to the land in which the Jewish nation was born. Neither of the two national ideals permits of combination in the service of a single State.

The conflict has grown steadily more bitter since and the process will continue. Conditions inside Palestine especially the systems of education, are strengthening the national sentiment of the two peoples. The bigger and more prosperous they grow the greater will be their political ambitions, and the conflict is aggravated by the uncertainty of the future.

Who in the end will govern Palestine? Meanwhile, the external factors will continue to operate with increasing force. On the one hand in less than three years' time Syria and the Lebanon will attain their national sovereignty, and the claim of the Palestinian Arabs to share in the freedom of all Asiatic Arabia will thus be fortified. On the other hand the hardships and anxieties of the Jews in Europe are not likely to grow less and the appeal to the good faith and humanity of the British people will lose none of its force.

Meanwhile, the Government of Palestine, which is at present an unsuitable form for governing educated Arabs and democratic Jews, cannot develop into a system of self-government as it has elsewhere, because there is no such system which could ensure justice both to the Arabs and to the Jews. Government therefore remains unrepresentative and unable to dispel the conflicting grievances of the two dissatisfied and irresponsible communities it governs.

In these circumstances peace can only be maintained in Palestine under the Mandate by repression. This means the maintenance of security services at so high a cost that the services directed to "the well-being and development" of the population cannot be expanded and may even have to be curtailed. The moral objections to repression are self-evident.

Nor need the undesirable reactions of it on opinion outside Palestine be emphasized. Moreover, repression will not solve the problem.

It will exacerbate the quarrel. It will not help towards the establishment of a single self-governing Palestine. It is not easy to pursue the dark path of repression without seeing daylight at the end of it. The British people will not flinch from the task of continuing to govern Palestine under the Mandate if they are in honour bound to do so, but they would be justified in asking if there is no other way in which their duty can be done. Nor would Britain wish to repudiate her obligations.

The trouble is that they have proved irreconcilable, and this conflict is the more unfortunate because each of the obligations taken separately accords with British sentiment and British interest.

The development of self-government in the Arab world on the one hand is in accordance with British principles, and British public opinion is wholly sympathetic with Arab aspirations towards a new age of unity and prosperity in the Arab world. British interest similarly has always been bound up with the peace of the Middle East and British statesmanship can show an almost unbroken record of friendship with the Arabs. There is a strong British tradition, on the other hand, of friendship with the Jewish people, and it is in the British interest to retain as far as may be the confidence of the Jewish people.

The continuance of the present system means the gradual alienation of two peoples who are traditionally the friends of Britain. The problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want. The answer to the question which of them in the end will govern Palestine must be Neither.

No fair-minded statesman can think it right either that , Jews, whose entry into Palestine has been facilitated by he British Government and approved by the League of Nations, should be handed over to Arab rule, or that, if the Jews should become a majority, a million Arabs should be handed over to their rule.

But while neither race can fairly rule all Palestine, each race might justly rule part of it. The idea of Partition has doubtless been thought of before as a solution of the problem, but it has probably been discarded as being impracticable. The difficulties are certainly very great, but when they are closely examined they do not seem so insuperable as the difficulties inherent in the continuance of the Mandate or in any other alternative arrangement.

Partition offers a chance of ultimate peace. No other plan does. The political division of Palestine could be effected in a less thorough manner than by Partition. It could be divided like Federal States into provinces and cantons, which would be self-governing in such matters as immigration and land sales as well as social services. The Mandatory Government would remain as a central or federal government controlling such matters as foreign relations, defence, customs and the like.

Cantonisation is attractive at first sight because it seems to solve the three major problems of land, immigration and self-government, but there are obvious weaknesses in it. First, the working of federal systems depends on sufficient community of interest or tradition to maintain harmony between the Central Government and the cantons. In Palestine both Arabs and Jews would regard the Central Government as an alien and interfering body.

Secondly, the financial relations between the Central Government and the cantons would revive the existing quarrel between Arabs and Jews as to the distribution of a surplus of federal revenue or as to the contributions of the cantons towards a federal deficit. Unrestricted Jewish immigration into the Jewish canton might lead to a demand for the expansion of federal services at the expense of the Arab canton.

Thirdly, the costly task of maintaining law and order would still rest mainly on the Central Government. Fourthly, Cantonisation like Partition cannot avoid leaving a minority of each race in the area controlled by the other. The solution of this problem requires such bold measures as can only be contemplated if there is a prospect of final peace.

Partition opens up such a prospect. Cantonisation does not. Lastly, Cantonisation does not settle the question of national self-government. Neither the Arabs nor the Jews would feel their political aspirations were satisfied with purely cantonal self-government. Cantonisation, in sum, presents most, if not all, of the difficulties presented by Partition without Partition's one supreme advantage--the possibilities it offers of eventual peace.

While the Commission would not be expected to embark oil the further protracted inquiry which would be needed for working out a scheme of Partition in full detail, it would be idle to put forward the principle of Partition and not to give it any concrete shape.

Clearly it must be shown that an actual plan can be devised which meets the main requirements of the case. The Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria. A new Mandate for the Holy Places should be instituted to fulfil the purposes defined in Section 2 below. Treaties of alliance should be negotiated by the Mandatory with the Government of Trans-Jordan and representatives of the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand and with the Zionist Organisation on the other.

These Treaties would declare that, within as short a period as may be convenient, two sovereign independent States would be established--the one an Arab State consisting of Trans-Jordan united with that part of Palestine which lies to the cast and south of a frontier such as we suggest in Section 3 below; the other a Jewish State consisting of that part of Palestine which lies to the north and west of that frontier.

The Mandatory would undertake to support any requests for admission to the League of Nations which the Governments of the Arab and the Jewish States might make.

The Treaties would include strict guarantees for the protection of minorities in each State, and the financial and other provisions to which reference will be made in subsequent Sections.

Military conventions would be attached to the Treaties, dealing with the maintenance of naval, military and air forces, the upkeep and use of ports, roads and railways, the security of the oil pipe line and so forth. The Partition of Palestine is subject to the overriding necessity of keeping the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem inviolate and of ensuring free and safe access to them for all the world.

That, in the fullest sense of the mandatory phrase, is "a sacred trust of civilization"--a trust on behalf not merely of the peoples of Palestine but of multitudes in other lands to whom those places, one or both, are Holy Places. A new Mandate, therefore, should be framed with the execution of this trust as its primary purpose. An enclave should be demarcated extending from a point north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem, and access to the sea should be provided by a corridor extending to the north of the main road and to the south of the railway, including the towns Lydda and Ramle, and terminating at Jaffa.

The protection of the Holy Places is a permanent trust, unique in its character and purpose, and not contemplated by Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it might frankly be stated that this trust will only terminate if and when the League of Nations and the United States desire it to do so, and that, while it would be the trustee's duty to promote the well-being and development of the local population concerned, it is not intended that in course of time they should stand by themselves as a wholly self-governing community.

Guarantees as to the rights of the Holy Places and free access thereto as provided in Article 13 of the existing Mandate , as to transit across the mandated area, and as to non-discrimination in fiscal, economic and other matters should be maintained in accordance with the principles of the Mandate System.

But the policy of the Balfour Declaration would not apply; and no question would arise of balancing Arab against Jewish claims or vice versa. All the inhabitants of the territory would stand on an equal footing. The only official language" would be that of the Mandatory Administration. Good and just government without regard for sectional interests would be its basic principle.

It would accord with Christian sentiment in the world at large if Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee Lake Tiberias were also covered by this Mandate. The Mandatory should be entrusted with the administration of Nazareth and with full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias. The Mandatory should similarly be charged with the protection of religious endowments and of such buildings, monuments and places in the Arab and Jewish States as are sacred to the Jews and the Arabs respectively.

For the upkeep of the Mandatory Government, a certain revenue should be obtainable, especially from the large and growing urban population in its charge, both by way of customs duties and by direct taxation; but it might prove insufficient for the normal cost of the administration.

In that event, it is suggested that, in all the circumstances, Parliament would be willing to vote the money needed to make good the deficit. The natural principle for the Partition of Palestine is to separate land and settled from the areas in which the Jews have acquired land and settled from those which are who are wholly or mainly occupied by Arabs.

This offers a fair and practicable basis for Partition, provided that in accordance with the spirit of British obligations, 1 a reasonable allowance is made within the boundaries of the Jewish State for the growth of population and colonization, and 2 reasonable compensation is given to the Arab State for the loss of land and revenue.

Any proposal for Partition would be futile if it gave no indication, however rough, as to how the most vital question in the whole matter might be determined, i.

As a solution of the problem, which seems both practicable and just, a rough line is proposed below. A Frontier Commission should be appointed to demarcate the precise frontier. Starting from Ras an Naqura, it follows the existing northern and eastern frontier of Palestine to Lake Tiberias and crosses the Lake to the outflow of the River Jordan, whence it continues down the river to a point a little north of Beisan.

It then cuts across the Beisan Plain and runs along the southern edge of the Valley of Jezreel and across the Plain of Esdraelon to a point near Megiddo, whence it crosses the Carmel ridge in the neighbourhood of the Megiddo road. Having thus reached the Maritime Plain, the line runs southwards down its eastern edge, curving west to avoid Tulkarm, until it reaches the Jerusalem-Jaffa corridor near Lydda. South of the Corridor it continues down the edge of the Plain to a point about 10 miles south of Rehovot, when it turns west to the sea.

The observations and recommendations are made with regard to the proposed frontier and to questions arising from it The proposed frontier would prevent the utilization of those lands for the southward expansion of the Jewish National Home. On the other hand, the Jewish lands in Galilee, and in particular the Huleh basin which offers a notable opportunity for development and colonization , would be in the Jewish Area. This is the part of Palestine in which the Jews have retained a foothold almost if not entirely without a break from the beginning of the Diaspora to the present day, and the sentiment of all Jewry is deeply attached to the "holy cities" of Safad and Tiberias.

Until quite recently, moreover the Jews in Galilee have lived on friendly terms with their Arab neighbours; and throughout the series of disturbances the fellaheen of Galilee have shown themselves less amenable to political incitement than those of Samaria and Judaea where the centres of Arab nationalism are located. At the "mixed" towns of Tiberias, Safad, Haifa, and Acre there have been varying degrees of friction since the "disturbances" of last year.

It would greatly promote the successful operation of Partition in its early stages, and in particular help to ensure the execution of the Treaty guarantees for the protection of minorities, if those four towns were kept for a period under Mandatory administration. The question of its communication with the latter presents no difficulty, since transit through the Jaffa-Jerusalem Corridor would be open to all.

Arab fighters from outside Palestine had also joined the struggle. The British army in Palestine had employed brutal measures to crush the revolt, including mass arrest, house demolitions, and executions. The commission arrived in the first week of November , during a lull in the fighting. Lord Peel, who chaired the commission, had served in the early s as Secretary of State for India.

The other commissioners included two senior colonial officials: Laurie Hammond, who had served as governor of Assam in the late s and chairman of the Indian delineation committee in —36; and Morris Carter, who had served as governor of Tanganyika Territory in the early s and chairman of the Kenya land commission in — Coupland was an Africanist and an editor of the journal The Round Table from to The commissioners stayed in the King David Hotel, but the majority of the testimony was heard in a British government building that had formally been the Palace Hotel on Agron Street in the Mamilla district of West Jerusalem.

The official terms of reference set before the commission left London were. But transcripts of the secret testimony reveal that the commissioners in fact ranged far beyond their terms of reference, including asking witnesses what they thought of partition as a possible solution.

Procedurally speaking, the commission did not request of individuals that they give testimony. Anyone could apply to give testimony, as long as they abided by the application procedures and deadlines. The British government did not meet this demand and the AHC boycotted the commission during its first few weeks in Palestine.

Members of the AHC then gave public testimony to the commission. This public testimony is available today in Arabic and English. It makes fascinating reading. It shows Palestinian leaders doing everything they could to make a detailed and precise case for their rights. The Palestinian testimony was published in the Arabic language press to inform the Palestinian people, many of whom had paid a price for rebelling against British rule and suffered from brutal British counterinsurgency methods, of what exactly their leaders were saying to the commissioners.

The Palestinians did not participate in the secret sessions, although the procedures of the commission allowed them to apply to do so. One of the reasons for this was that the names of all those who participated in the secret sessions were published; the Palestinian leadership did not want to be seen to negotiate behind closed doors with the British, at a time of great suffering for the Palestinian people.

By contrast, Zionist leaders gave copious testimony in the secret sessions. When partition was ruled impracticable, Britain invited Zionists, Arab state leaders, and Palestinians to London in early to confer about future policy. Gathering war clouds in Europe and concern for maintaining reasonable relations with Arab leaders meant ending the unrest in Palestine by truncating the Jewish national home.

That directive came via the May White Paper that severely limited Jewish immigration and land purchase. The partition proposal had long-term ramifications for the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine. There is no doubt that the Arabs in Palestine knew that Zionism was already a success. The idea of partition was eventually withdrawn, because it was felt certain to alienate positive Arab sentiment toward Britain.

There should be no hesitation in dispensing with the services of Palestinian officers whose loyalty or impartiality is uncertain. Public Safety. Should disorders break out again of such a nature as to require the intervention of the military, there should be no hesitation in enforcing martial law. In such an event, the disarmament first of the Arabs and then of the Jews should be enforced. Financial and Fiscal Questions. Negotiations should be opened to amend the provisions of Article 18 of the Mandate and put the trade of Palestine on a fairer basis.

The High Commissioner should be empowered to prohibit the transfer of land in any stated area to Jews. The amendment of the Mandate may first be necessary.

Until survey and settlement are complete, the sale of isolated and comparatively small plots of land to Jews should be prohibited. The Commission favors a proposal for the creation of special Public Utility Companies to undertake development schemes. In the event of further sales of land by Arabs to Jews, the rights of any Arab tenants or cultivators must be preserved. Alienation of land should only be allowed where it is possible to replace extensive by intensive cultivation, i.

Legislation vesting surface water in the High Commission is essential. Possibilities of irrigation should be explored. The scheme for the development of the Huleh district is commended. This high level should be fixed for the next five years at 12, per annum.

The Administration should regard the claims on the revenue of Arab education as second in importance only to those of public security. The present proportion between the grant to Jewish education and the amount spent on the Arabs should not be altered: an increase in the grant to the Jews should result from an increase in the total expenditure on education. In any further discussion of the project of a British University in the Near East, the possibility should be considered of locating it in the neighborhood of Jerusalem or Haifa.

Local Government. An attempt should be made to strengthen those few local councils which still exist in Arab rural areas, but not to revivify councils which have been broken down, or to create new ones unless there is a genuine demand for them. The more important local councils and all the municipalities should be reclassified, by means of a new Ordinance, into groups according to their respective size and importance.

The services of an expert on local government should be obtained to assist in drafting the new Ordinance and improving the relations between the Government and the municipalities.

Self-Governing Institutions. The Commission does not recommend that any attempt be made to revive the proposal of a Legislative Council, but they would welcome an enlargement of the Advisory Council by the addition of Unofficial Members. Having reached the conclusion that there is no possibility of solving the Palestine problem under the existing Mandate or even under a scheme of cantonization , the Commission recommends the termination of the present Mandate on the basis of Partition and put forward a definite scheme which they consider to be practicable, honorable, and just.

The scheme is as follows:. The Mandate for Palestine should terminate and be replaced by a Treaty System in accordance with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria. Under Treaties to be negotiated by the Mandatory with the Government of Transjordan and representatives of the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand, and with the Zionist Organization on the other, it would be declared that two sovereign independent States would shortly be established:.

The Mandatory would undertake to support any requests for admission to the League of Nations made by the Governments for the Arab and Jewish States. The Treaties would include strict guarantees for the protection of minorities.

Military Conventions would be attached to the Treaties. A new Mandate should be instituted to execute the trust of maintaining the sanctity of Jerusalem and Bethlehem and ensuring free and safe access to them for all the world. An enclave should be demarcated to which this Mandate should apply, extending from a point north of Jerusalem to a point south of Bethlehem, and access to the sea should be provided by a corridor extending from Jerusalem to Jaffa.

The policy of the Balfour Declaration would not apply to the Mandated Area. The Mandatory should also be entrusted with the administration of Nazareth and with full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the waters and shores of Lake Tiberias, and similarly with the protection of religious endowments and of such buildings, monuments and places in the Arab and Jewish States as are sacred to the Jews and the Arabs respectively.

The frontier between the Arab and Jewish States recommended is as follows: Starting from Ras an Naqura, it follows the existing northern and eastern frontier of Palestine to Lake Tiberias and crosses the Lake to the outflow of the River Jordan, whence it continues down the river to a point rather north of Beisan.

It then cuts across the Beisan Plain and runs along the southern edge of the Valley of Jezreel to a point near Megiddo, whence it crosses the Carmel Ridge in the neighborhood of the Megiddo Road. It then runs southward down the eastern edge of the Maritime Plain, curving west to avoid Tulkarm, until it reaches the Jerusalem-Jaffa Corridor near Lydda.

South of the Corridor, it continues down the edge of the Plain to a point about ten miles south of Rehovot, whence it turns west to the sea. Haifa, Tiberias, Safad, and Acre should be kept for a period under Mandatory administration. Jaffa should form an outlying part of the Arab State, narrow belts of land being acquired and cleared on the north and south sides of the town to provide access from the Mandatory Corridor to the sea.

In view of possible commercial developments in the future, an enclave on the north-west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba should be retained under Mandatory administration, and the Arab Treaty should provide for free transit of goods between the Jewish State and this enclave, as also to the Egyptian frontier at Rafah.

The Treaty should provide for similar facilities for the transit of goods between the Mandated Area and Haifa, Rafah, and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Jewish State should pay a subvention to the Arab State.

A Finance Commission should be appointed to advise as to its amount and as to the division of the public debt of Palestine and other financial questions. As a part of the proposed Treaty System, a Commercial Convention should be concluded with a view to establishing a common tariff over the widest possible range of imported articles and to facilitating the freest possible interchange of goods between the three territories. The rights of all existing Civil Servants, including rights to pensions or gratuities, should be fully honored.

Agreements entered into by the Government of Palestine for the development and security of industries, e. Guarantees to that effect should be given in the Treaties. The security of the power station at Jisr el Majami should be similarly guaranteed.